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ABSTRACT
The question invariably arises in Navy public works organizations
whether to fabricate or purchase certain material components utilized
in station maintenance work. Applicable cost concepts for decision
purposes are discussed and the literature on the subject of make or buy
is reviewed . Factors which influence make-or-buy decisions in public
works activities of the Naval Material Support Establishment, as obtained
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF MAKE OR BUY IN PUBLIC
WORKS ORGANIZATIONS
Behind each purchase order . . . is a decision to buy
and not to make; and behind each production order is a
decision to make and not to buy. *
It is axiomatic in public works management that, if efficient
utilization of personnel and staffing stability are to be achieved
,
transitory workloads are best accomplished under contract. Therefore
significant non-recurring work; such as new construction, alterations,
and major repairs; are generally contracted and station force efforts are
focused on the routine maintenance and service functions . A recent trend
has been to secure an increasing volume of this latter category of work via
contractual arrangements when it can be demonstrated that cost reductions
will accrue
.
But incidental to the performance of that work which is unquestionably
best accommodated by station forces , the question invariably arises whether
to fabricate or purchase certain material components. Despite the frequency
with which alternative choices of this nature occur in public works organi-
zations and are dealt with, consciously or unconsciously, there is little
1James W. Culliton, Make or Buy (Boston: Harvard University,




in the way of official guidance to tell the public works officer how to make
the choice, and there is even less dealing with the manner in which he
should proceed when confronted with the alternatives. Armed Services
Procurement Regulations touch upon the subject of make or buy, but from
the standpoint of administering large procurement contracts wherein the
prime contractor elects to make or sub-contract. This source fails to shed
much light on the problem at hand. Fortunately make-or-b|iy alternatives
have received considerable attention in the literature of the business world.
I . THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem. It is the purpose of this study (1) to
ascertain the factors influencing make-or-iauy decisions involving material
components used by station maintenance forces of the Naval Material Sup-
port Establishment, as revealed through a questionnaire study; and (2)
coincidental thereto, to review and evaluate some current practices.
Importance of the study . The scarcity of policy direction might be
interpreted as an indication that either no problem or one of no consequence
exists. This is not considered to be the case. Oblique inferences suggest
that the Navy Department favors a policy of buy rather than make, but
desists from formalized policy direction in recognition of the multitude of
variables confronting the local activity. While it is essential that the
flexibility of choice be retained at the operating level if the decision-maker

is to be effective, it should also be recognized that decentralization can
lead to less than optimum results. The side effects of a choice which is
advantageous to one component of an entity may prove to be detrimental to
another or at odds with over-all organizational objectives . Decisions which
neglect such consequences are said to "sub-optimize". Investigation that
high-lights relevent considerations, which might be overlooked in make-or-buy
determinations, should serve to improve these decisions and lessen the chance
of "sub-optimization". Hopefully this study in some measure will contribute
to this goal.
II . DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Make-or-buy decision . Throughout this report, the term "make-or-buy
decision" shall be interpreted as meaning the choice between: (1) manufacture
or fabrication by station force personnel of the public works department and
(2) commercial procurement or requisitioning from standard stock. A public
works department decision to have an item fabricated by an industrial
department of the same or another activity on a reimbursable basis is to be
regarded as a "buy" decision.
Influencing factors . All matters, whether internal or external in origin,
which are evaluated in arriving at a determination to make or buy shall be
interpreted as "influencing factors".

III. ASSUMPTIONS
Preparatory to undertaking this study it was hypothesized that
make-or-buy decisions in public works organizations sometimes include
irrelevant or exclude relevant considerations .
IV. LIMITATIONS
This study does not attempt to develop or provide a step-by-step
procedure by which a decision-maker can select the alternative. Further
no general conclusion will be advanced whether buying or making is better.
Emphasis is upon factors, which if overlooked or improperly evaluated, may
lead to incorrect decisions
.
Scope of study. The investigation is confined to decisions to
fabricate or purchase material components utilized on job orders accomplished
by public works shops . Determinations to accomplish repair , maintenance
,
renovation, alteration, minor improvement or service work by contract
versus station force accomplishment are excluded.
Weighing the arguments . Arguments bearing on a make-or-buy decision
may run the gamut from those which are so conclusive as to dictate the
decision to those which are minor and relatively unimportant. The task
confronting the decision-maker is not only to insure that all the pertinent
considerations have been collected but to evaluate and weigh them against

one another and in relation to the problem as a whole. Should one factor
be so dominant as to dictate the decision, further analysis is superfluous.
In other cases many factors must be carefully evaluated. A con-
sideration which is comparatively trivial in one instance may be decisive
in another situation. Consequently no argument discussed in this paper
should be considered in itself without relating it to all others and, in
particular, the frame of reference posed by the specific case at hand.
Method of survey . The study survey was accomplished by means of
a questionnaire with the attendant possibility of misinterpretation of questions
and responses. Semantic differences and design deficiencies are but a few
of the potential communication difficulties.
V . ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF THE PAPER
The review of the literature covered in the next chapter is accomplished
in two stages. Since an understanding of cost is essential prior to a dis-
cussion of alternative choice, the first section is devoted to cost concepts,
while a review of make or buy literature per se is presented in the section
which follows
.
The mechanics of the study are dealt with in Chapter III and the results
are presented in Chapter IV, where a two-section approach is again utilized.
The first section presents in tabular form the statistical data gathered.
Comments on some current practices are provided in the second.

A summary, conclusions, implications and recommendations are
contained in the final chapter.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
I . SOME NOTES ON COST
Introduction . In the broad economic sense, cost is the determinant
for making or for buying. If all the variables posed by a problem of alter-
native choice were readily measurable in terms of dollars, the decision-
maker's selection would be greatly simplified,, In the conventional sense,
cost dictates the decision, other things being equal.
An understanding of different cost concepts is helpful to decision-
making in several ways . In gathering together the factors which bear on a
choice, the chance of an oversight is reduced.. In the sorting-out process,
pertinent considerations are brought more sharply into focus. Finally, a
grasp of relevant cost concepts may permit the quantification of some of the
"other things".
Thus a review of some of the more commonly utilized classifications
is appropriate; and at this point, their summarization facilitates the review
of make-or-bjuy literature and subsequent discussions in Chapter IV.
Costs from a cost accounting system . In problems involving alter-
native choice , the decision-maker is primarily interested in future rather
than past costs. Occasions will arise , however, when it is necessary to
extract figures from the accounting system. A few words of caution are
in order at the outset.

Traditionally the accounting responsibility has been to maintain and
report the financial history of the organization. "Original" and verifiable
eosts have been required to fulfill this function, and account classifications
have evolved basically along object of expenditure classification lines for
ease of verification. When functional classifications have been superimposed,
as with cost accounting systems, it has been necessary to assume that
original outlays can be allocated among functions on some preselected basis,
such as direct labor hours or square footage of floor area. But the most
equitable proration bases devisable are at best somewhat arbitrary and
inflexible.
In general, allocated or prorated accounting charges should be viewed
with skepticism since the emphasis on overhead absorption yields misleading
results for many applications. Cost accounting provides excellent mangerial
control and appraisal techniques, but in order to estimate what will happen
to cost, it is frequently necessary to look behind the scene of an overhead
rate and analyze individually the various elements of which it is comprised.
Opportunity versus outlay costs . Outlay costs pertain to actual
financial expenditures which are recorded in the accounts. The term
"explicit" is sometimes used in a similar context. Opportunity costs
represent the costs of an opportunity which is foregone when resources are
assigned to one purpose and are not available for another. Certain intangibles,
such as inconvenience, may be extremely difficult to quantify. Other oppor-
tunity^ costs can be readily assigned a dollar value.
8

Suppose, for example, that a piece of labor saving equipment is
assigned to a job to replace four workers when an alternate use would have
permitted a labor saving of five men. An opportunity cost equivalent to one
worker is incurred. Such costs are often called "implicit" or "imputed"
costs, since they are not recorded. While not a costing technique, the rate
of return analysis employed by accountants to evaluate alternative invest-
ments is conceptually akin to the idea of opportunity costs.
Opportunity cost is the cost concept to use when the input resources
available are limited. Its message to management is that it is dangerous to
confine cost knowledge to what is being done and ignore what could be done.
Economic versus accounting costs . Economic cost implies the return
or value which has been foregone or sacrificed by allocating resources or
productive factors to one alternative rather than another. This definition
includes the values of physical resources utilized and tangible and intangible
opportunity costs. Accounting costs refer to the cost figures entered in the
accounts, however they may be derived. For some outlay costs, such as




ljoel Dean, Managerial Economics
,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice -Hall, Ind. , 1951), p. 260.
9
Neil W. Chamberlain, The Firm : Micro-Economic Planning and
Action, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company , Inc., 1962), p. 145.
9

On the other hand there are elements of cost which are not
common to both. Inputed or opportunity costs are economic costs which
are not recorded and consequently are not accounting costs . Certain
accounting costs, such as depreciation, are neither outlay nor economic
costs
.
Traceable versus common costs . Traceable costs are costs which
can be readily identified with a given product, operation, or service.
3Costs which are not traceable are said to be common. The criterion of
traceability is generally employed in accounting to distinguish between
direct and indirect costs . The degree of traceability will vary among
costs. Some may be traceable to the final product, while it is impractical
to isolate others below a division or branch level. It is not essential that
a cost possess perfect traceability for this differentiation to be useful to
management.
Incremental versus sunk costs . Incremental cost is similar to
marginal cost. But whereas marginal cost is the additional cost of
increasing output by one unit, incremental cost may be defined as the
4
addition to total cost which results from a particular decision.
Norman N . Barish , Economic Analysis for Engineering and
Managerial Decision -Making
,




4W. Warren Haynes and Joseph L. Massie, Management Analysis :
Concepts and Cases
.




Incremental costs are the valid costs to be considered when the alternatives
involve a choice of different levels of activity. If the alternative selected
is to continue well into the future, care must be taken to insure that long-
run effects are not overlooked.
Sunk costs are the costs that are not altered by the decision in
question and are irrelevant. In most instances, when cost is an argument,
management decisions will best be served by comparative estimates which
utilize an incremental cost approach.
«
Incremental and sunk costs are not necessarily characterized as
common, fixed, variable, outlay, or traceable costs. Opportunity costs
are frequently the most significant cost element in short-run problems
.
Short -run versus long-run costs . This concept is concerned with
the distinction to be found in cost behavior patterns . Economic theory
roughly describes short-run costs as those associated with variation in the
use of facilities of fixed scale. The long run implies a sufficient period
for the scale of plant to be varied. For example, increased production is
achieved in the short run by the application of additional direct labor and
material; in the long run additional equipment, facilities and administrative
staff are added.
The lesson for management is that while the variable or direct
elements of cost are relevant for short-run situations, in the long run




nominally fixed and indirect costs will also vary. In using incremental
costs , long-run effects should be considered when alternatives involve
a choice affecting future levels of activity.
Escapeable versus unavoidable costs . The distinction between these
costs is basically the same as that between incremental and sunk costs.
Incremental and escapeable costs change with level of activity while
sunk and unavoidable costs do not. Specifically the terms incremental
and sunk connoteAcoifiparisons involving added activity, whereas escapeable
and unavoidable refer to decrements of activity . Some writers aggregate
7
escapeable and incremental costs into the term "differential costs "o
In comparing most alternative choices, management is primarily
concerned with the net difference between escapeable and incremental
costs. To illustrate: if the choice was to buy something now being made,
a comparison of the escapeable costs of making with the incremental costs
of buying would reveal the costlier alternative.
Escapeability refers to the ease with which a cost may be reduced,
and the term "reducible" is sometimes used in lieu of escapeable. All
costs, of course, are escapeable in the long run.
°Barrish , op_. cit
. , p. 47
7
Robert N „ Anthony , Management Accounting : Text and Cases
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 360.
12

Variable versus fixed costs. The distinction between variable and
fixed costs lies in the degree to which the total changes with increases
or decreases in volume. Direct labor and materials may be expected to
vary proportionately with the level of output. Certain administrative
expenses, on the other hand, may be substantially fixed or constant over
a considerable range of activity.
In actuality many costs fall some where between variable and fixed
and are sometimes referred to as semi-variable or semi-fixed. It is
sufficient to say that costs often contain both variable and fixed elements
.
Consider the maintenance expense of a building. The maintenance of a
roof is essentially a fixed cost; interior maintenance may vary with usage
or the nature of occupancy.
This concept is useful in incremental analysis when concerned
with forecasting the cost impact of short-run changes in volume. What
is to be regarded as fixed will be influenced by management determinations
of which services are "unavoidable" and which are "escapeable"
.
Direct versus indirect costs . Direct and indirect costs are dis-
tinguished by the manner in which they are costed. Traceable costs
which are segregated and charged directly to a job, product, service,
or operation are said to be direct costs. Common costs and unsegregated
,
8
traceable costs which are not directly charged are called indirect costs.
o
Barrish, op_. cit., p. 44
13

When accumulated, indirect costs are subsequently allocated on a
prorata basis to end products, services, or operations they are commonly
referred to as burden or overhead costs.
While traceability is the primary criterion used to identify direct
cost, it is frequently impractical or economically prohibitive to segregate
and separately charge all traceable costs. Thus overhead may contain
trace elements of direct cost. To comprehend precisely what costs are
reflected in overhead , an understanding of the accounting system from
which they are derived is a requisite.
Controllable versus non -controllable costs . This concept is
primarily used to establish the organizational level at which a cost is
controllable o Variable costs, such as direct labor, may be controllable
at work center level. Division overhead, such as supervision, obviously
is non-controllable at the level of a work center, while at the department
level it may be viewed as controllable.
In some respects this classification is similar to the escapeable
versus unavoidable concept. The essential distinction is that controll-
ability refers to the managerial level at which it is exercised, whereas
escapeability implies the ease with which a cost can be reduced. Direct
material costs may be controllable by a work center from the standpoint
of waste and spoilage. They are not escapeable unless a decision is
made to cancel work.
14

Conclusion , Although not exhaustive, the foregoing classifications
are sufficient to illustrate that there are different costs for different pur-
poses. It is evident that cost is a point of view. Unvarying definitions,
which are essential for determining the status and disposition of funds,
are not necessarily relevant for decision-making. An approximation of





II . LITERATURE ON MAKE OR BUY
Sources. The sources searched fell into three broad categories:
(1) studies that dealt exclusively with the subject of make-or-buy
decisions, (2) managerial texts which devoted a section of a chapter or
more to the subject or contained a make-or-buy case, and (3) articles
which have appeared in business periodicals. It was determined that
studies of the subject are rare; and of necessity, availability was the
dominate criteria of selection. The second source was found to possess
either purchasing, managerial accounting, or industrial engineering
orientations a Selections were drawn from each field represented using
recent publication dates as a supplemental criterion. Research of
periodicals was confined to the 1954 through 1964 period.
Studies . In his classic study Culliton noted that cost, in the
broad sense, was the only factor determining a makenor-buy decision,
but that this criterion had practical limitations because many immeasurable
9
elements were included. Various concepts of cost in a narrower context
were offered with methods to obtain them and specific examples of their
calculation. Other controllable factors influencing make-or-buy
James W. Culliton, Make or Buy (Boston: Harvard University,
Graduate School of Business Administration, 1942), p. 7.
10Ibid.
,




decisions were categorized as quality, quantity and miscellaneous.
The consequences and subsidiary effects of decisions relative to the
firm as a whole are examined and illustrated with various cases, and
the impact of uncontrollable external forces , such as war, cyclical changes,
12
and political conditions are explored. Culliton came to the conclusion
that buy was most frequently the preferable alternative. His conclusion
was predicated on the observations: (1) the impossibility of buying as a
make argument tended to be offered after the fact and appeared to smack
of rationalization; (2) many executives failed to recognize make-or-buy
problems , and executive machinery for discovering make-or-buy decisions
:wffs nonexistent; (3) firms were lax in reviewing decisions once they were
made, especially those which led to the adoption of a make program; (4)
claims of inability to buy required quality were often coupled with lacka-
daisical procurement effort; and (5) few concerns seem/ed to give any
attention to the change in their organization caused by the addition of
something new. °
Referring to make-or-buy decisions, Oxenfeldt and Watkins state,
"Personal interviews with members of top management . . . suggest that
11 Ibid_.
, Chapters IV , V , and VIII.
1
2




, pp . 98 , 99
17

probably a larger proportion of these decisions turn out badly than that
14
of any other type of business decision, " They are persuaded that
business most often errs in the direction of make. Accordingly their
study accentuates the negative factors in making. It was observed
that many firms placed make-or-buy decisions in a class apart from other
investment criteria and failed to subject them to the scrutiny of a return
1
6
on investment analysis. The inspiration for the study was the hypothesis
that there was a revitalization of management interest in make-or-buy
decisions, attributable to merger and integration trends. Hence the
17
exposition stressed make decisions which emerge as a consequence.
Oxenfeldt and Watkins contended that the consideration most frequently
overlooked or improperly evaluated in a decision to adopt a make program
was the element of risk. They pointed out that fluctuations in the business
cycle may strand a firm with large investments in excess capacity and
fixed overhead. The argument was also made that the vulnerability of the
maker to technological changes favored buying. Various cases were
18
cited to expound these points. It was concluded: (1) the choice was
14Alfred R. Oxenfeldt and Myron W. Watkins, Make or Buy :
Factors Affecting Executive Decisions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1956), pp. ii, iii.
15
Ibid_.





, pp. 16-79. 18Ibid. , pp. 80-94.
18

more often dictated by general policy considerations than by careful
appraisals— firms seemed to favor either making or buying as a matter
of principle; (2) some firms were preoccupied with a concern for the
security of supply, to the exclusion of all other considerations; (3)
calculations for make-or-buy analyses were clumsy; (4) officials
neglected to take into account firms' previous experiences prior to
embarking on new make-or-buy programs
,
and executive opinion within
the firm regarding the success or failure of past programs varied widely;
and (5) businesses may be wiser to rely upon competition among their
suppliers than their ability to determine relative advantages of making
19
versus buying.
Books. As might be expected, the make-or-buy arguments most
cogently expressed by the purchasing fraternity were usually for buying.
Westing and Fine observed that quality as an argument for making was
valid, at best, only in the short run. They suggested that it was more
probable that either the quality specified exceeded ^qufeements or that
producers had no assured recurring demand for the quality specified.
The issues, they contended, are whether the user can economically and






suppliers is not a temporary condition. Quantity, they stress, is a
variable; and a decision to make less than minimum order quantities was
invalid, unless buying larger amounts and carrying an inventory had been
21 '
explored. Other factors being equal, cost considerations introduced by
make decisions were enumerated as : (1) additional cost of buying, shipping,
handling, and storing raw materials; and (2) added machinery and personnel
22
training. Hodges noted that the estimated costs of making were not
23
always reliable , and that buying on the outside fixes cost. Purchasing
considers quality, service, and price in that order, he contended, while
in making, cost is given first consideration since management assumes it
24
will have adequate control of the other factors.
Divergent viewpoints were expressed by accounting texts regarding
the treatment of costs to make. The generally conservative position taken
by Nickerson was that the question of cost in make-or-buy decions centered
20
John H . Westing and I . V . Fine , Industrial Purchasing , Buying
for Industry and Institutions (New York: John Wiley and Sons , Inc . , 1961)
,
pp. 207, 208.
21Ibid., p. 210. 22Ibid., p. 212.
2
^Harry G . Hodges , Procurement , the Modern Science of




on the choice with the lowest variable cost. With respect to arguments
to exclude overhead and unused capacity costs for making a new item,
he stated, "If such refinements in computations are necessary
. „ . to
25justify making . . . it is probably best ... to buy." On the matter
of abandoning making to buy, he recommended a comparison of only the
variable costs of making with purchase costs. He added, that if buying
was continued over a longer period, certain of the fixed costs may become
escapeable , but such savings should not be taken into account in a short
-
run decision. A less conservative view with respect to the treatment
of overhead expense was that taken by Haseman. In the comparative
analyses he illustrated, indirect overhead was specifically excluded as
fixed cost when unused capacity was available . Manufacturing expense
27
or direct overhead was assumed to be variable.
Industrial engineering approaches to make of buy ranged from
economic concepts to highly definitive interpretations. Matchett focused
attention primarily on the investment aspects of the make-or-buy problem.
25Clarence B. Nickerson, Managerial Cost Accounting and
Analysis : Text, Problems , and Cases (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1S62), p. 601.
26
Ibid., p. 602.
27Wilber C . Haseman , Management Uses of Accounting
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1963), pp. 638-640.
21

Making ordinarily requires investment, he explained, whereas the
buy decision conserves this capital but typically increases out-of-
pocket costs. "The question is whether enough can be saved in the
form of annual purchase costs to justify investing in productive facilities
. 28
required for the company to make the item. " Make or buy, as discussed
by Moore, had a connotation of exactness — this order, this item —
within the context of vertical integration. In this restricted sense,
security of supply, the amount of expenditure, and workload were listed
as factors influencing decisions. Make-or-buy decisions can help to
achieve stability of operations, he maintained, by buying during peak
periods and making during slack periods . He emphasized that make-or-
29buy decisions were not to be viewed as permanent.
Periodicals . Contributors to the business literature on the subject
of make or buy reflected a cross section of interests. Included were chief
executives and senior operating officials of manufacturing and industrial
concerns. Comptroller and purchasing functionaries were represented and
oo
Gerald J. Matchett, "Economic Evaluation -~Make or Buy —
Buy or Lease , " National Conference of the American Institute of Industrial
Engineers Proceedings : May 1963
,
Fourteenth Yearbook of the American
Institute of Industrial Engineers (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1963),
pp. 70, 7(1.
Franklin G. Moore, Manufacturing Management (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D Irwin, Inc., 1958), pp. 117, 118.
22

contributions from members of consulting firms and university staffs
were in evidence For purposes of review, several approaches were
considered but abandoned in favor of a chronological discourse.
Generally, Caditz attacked the notion of making what could be
bought. It was a fallacy to cost make items at less than full cost on the
theory that idle capacity was being utilized, he contended, because the
practice encouraged the retention of submarginal operations . He further
argued that once an item issbeing made, it may not receive tight operational
control; whereas in buying, control is exerted via competitive market forces
30
and the sorutiny of the pricing mechanism.
Increased emphasis on guaranteed annual wages and labor force
stability, Higgins believed, may force a revision of make-or-buy policies
31
to regularize employment. He noted that many decisions are automatic
or so minor as to be insignificant, but that top management judgement was
essential when a substantial annual dollar volume or capital expenditures
32
were involved. Estimated costs of new ventures were considered as
30C. C. Caditz, "Stampings - Should You Make Them or Buy
Them?" ThelrpnAge, C^XTV (September 23 , 1954), 108.
° Carter C . Higgins , "Make-or-Buy Re-Examined , " Harvard




usually understated. A middle-of-the road position was taken with
respect to overhead absorption. Higgins thought that the inclusion of
all overhead in costing a make item overstated cost, while the inclusion
of only direct overhead or manufacturing expense understated cost. In
summarization he stated, "Frequently, the difference between making and
buying in overhead is not big enough to be persuasive one way or the
33
other . "
In describing the approach of a small manufacturer to the make-or-
buy problem one writer cited the close liaison between production and
34purchasing as a key factor in obtaining correct decisions.
Cochran warned against the comparison of unit costs alone in
arriving at a make-or-buy decision and pointed out that it is necessary
to base approach on operating objectives. Unit-cost comparisons ignore
the impact of an investment in machines or rearrangements , which might
35dwarf savings . To preclude tying up facilities in making an item at the
sacrifice of having to buy another which possessed a greater make potential,
33
Ibid. ,115.
34Harold C. Bamett, "Make Small Company Profits Big,"
Purchasing , XLV (September 1, 1958), 68, 69.
35E. B. Cochran, "Better Make-or-Buy Decisions , "
Factory Management and Maintenance , CXVI (December, 19 58), 40
24

he emphasized that decisions must consider relationships. He recom-
mended make-or-buy alternatives be evaluated on a return-on-investment
36
basis and provided a number of case analyses to illustrate this approach.
Levine found the literature on the subject confusing due to the failure
of writers to identify what type of make-or-buy situation they were dis-
37
cussing. Three basic make or buy situations are described: (1) when
you can buy items which you can presently make, (2) when you have no
capacity, and (3) you have uneconomical make facilities. In the first
instance , he advocated adding any direct overhead under-absorption that
would result from buying to the supplier's quote in making a cost com-
parison. In the second, he recommended a return-on-investment approach,
38
and in the third a careful analysis of escapeable costs. "The rule
should be," he stated, "that when you have . . . capacity . . .
, .
39
you practically have no choice but to produce ..."
In a subsequent article on make or buy, Higgins noted that
rationality does not necessarily prevail in these decisions. Custom,
36Ibid. , 40-44.
*" Norman P. Levine, "How to Know When to Make or Buy,"
Purchasing , XLVI (January 5, 1959), 72.
38
Ibid . , 72-74. Note that for comparative purposes, adding to a





habit, and pride were cited as factors which often served as bases for
determinations
.
An explanation somewhat different from that of either Oxenfeldt or
Higgins was offered by Chapin to account for an intensification of interest
in make or buy. He hypothesized that some companies, believing they had
approached the limits of their markets , were integrating backward into the
41
business of suppliers. Chapin pointed out that cost analyses can be
time consuming and expensive. He also noted that elaborate analyses
tended to lull one into a sense of security when the most important
42
variables taken into account are often the least subject to measurement.
In particular, make decisions which would involve adding facilities were
considered to require scrutiny. Aspects reviewed were: (1) the loss of
liquidity through investment, (2) the risks inherent in analyses of new




Carter C . Higgins , "You Can Form Rational Make-or-Buy
Decisions," American Business , XXIX (February, 1959), 36.
41Roy Chapin, Jr. , "When Should You Make It Yourself? "
Dun's Review and Modern Industry , LXXIII (May, 1959), 54.





writing in the N.A.A . Bulletin
,
provided a broad overview
44
of the subject. Essentially, however, the concepts are a resume of
Culliton's Make or Buy .
An article, appearing in one business periodical, focused attention
on the essentiality of reviewing make-or-buy decisions. Weaknesses,
noted by several authorities, were cited and included the improper
calculation and proration of overhead cost and the failure to integrate
make-or-buy policy with long range planning. Criticism, however, was
45leveled primarily at letting decisions stand indefinitely.
In a study of relative tooling costs in the Detroit area
,
Paton and
Dixon found that independent job shops were able to produce at signifi-
cantly less cost than the captive shops of large firms, due to higher
46
overhead costs in the latter. This work also stressed that the cost
of a purchased die is final when the bid is accepted, while the same
cost assurance is missing when work is undertaken internally.
4 4Kenneth F. Schuba, "Make-or-Buy Decisions — Cost and
Non-Cost Considerations," N.A.A. Bulletin^ XII (March, 1960), 53-66.
4 5 "Updating Make-or-Buy , " Dun's Review and Modern Industry
LXXV (June, I960), 157.
46
"Tooling: Do You Make or Buy? " The Iron Age , CLXXXVIII
(July 13, 1961), 120 citing W. A. Paton and R. L. Dixon, Make-or-Buy
Decisions in Tooling for Mass Production (Bureau of Business Research,
School of Business Administration, University of Michigan).
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Two common mistakes, Hackamack contended, trap most
companies into incorrect make-or-buy decisions. These are: (1) the
problem is viewed as so complex that it can be approached only in
general "common sense" terms, or (2) the problem is oversimplified
47
and decision is made on raw "cost" figures alone. He warned against
comparisons predicated on unit costs and stressed that returns on invest-
ment must be compared. A quantitative approach, utilizing cheek lists
48
and ratings derived from the average of assigned weights, was illustrated.
Overhead rates, normally associated with customer pricing, have no
rightful place in make-or-buy decions was the view Ward expressed. He
considered that the basic concept to be followed in any decision of this
49
nature was that of out-of-pocket costs .
4
'Lawrence C. Hackamack, "Make or Buy Can Make or Break,"




Edwin F. Ward, "Making the Proper Make-or-Buy Decision,"






Critical analysis was the means selected to explore the problem
and facilitate the presentation of results.
II . MATERIALS
The investigation sought to determine the factors affecting and the
practices followed in making the choice between make-or-buy alternatives
in Navy public works organizations
.
III. RESPONDENTS
The organizations contacted were the public works centers and
public works departments of the Naval Material Support Establishment.
Respondents from public works centers included executive officers and
planning officers . Public works department respondents included public
works officers, assistant public works officers, administrative assistants,
and maintenance control division directors.
IV. TECHNIQUE
A questionnaire survey was utilized in conducting the study. The
questionnaire employed is attached as an appendix.

V. PROCEDURES
The first step in the conduct of the study was the initiation of a
search for appropriate reference material „ As material was located and
accumulated, it was tentatively researched for familiarization with the
various factors which influence make-or-buy decisions. Particular
attention was given those aspects considered to be applicable in the
instance of Navy public works organizations.
Subsequently a sample questionnaire for the proposed survey study
was designed and tested on student Civil Engineer Corps officers
possessing a background of public works experience and the Public
Works Officer of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. The questionnaire
was then revised in light of the constructive criticisms and suggestions
for improvement generated by the test. Copies of the revised question-
naire were thereafter mailed under covering letter request to all public
works center commanding officers and public works officers listed in
The Civil Engineer Corps Directory „
As responses were received, the data were tallied and compiled
on worksheets. Comments elicited were carefully reviewed, categorized
and tabulated. Concurrently the research of reference material was con-
tinued. The preparation of the report of investigation was then initiated
with the objective of presenting data relative to the factors currently






I . DATA OBTAINED
It. is little help to stress the need for a "careful examination
of all the relevant factors" before reaching a decision . That
kind of advice is on a par with the . . . admonition to
"be careful." 1
Participation . Of 184 public works organization contacted
,
152 responded. A negative reply given by one activity for security
reasons and an incomplete and unidentifiable response from a second
were excluded from the results obtained. Thus 150 positive responses
were obtained from the 184 organizations polled, and participation was
computed as 81.5 per cent.
Impact of policy . To a query whether or not the majority of
decisions were dictated by policies or directives which prohibited shop
fabrication or encouraged procurement, affirmative replies were given by
28 .0 per cent of the respondents.
Dominance of influencing factors . Respondents were requested to
rank in order of dominance the factors which most frequently influenced
Alfred R„ Oxenfeldt and Myron W. Watkins , Make or Buy :
Factors Affecting Executive Decisions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1956), p. 13.

make decisions. The results obtained are shown by Tables I through
III.
As might have been expected, "no source of supply" and "procurement
lead time" were more heavily weighted by overseas than continental U. S„
activities. On the other hand, continental activities assigned more import
to "workload and capability" and "comparative costs" than did overseas
activities
.
Surprisingly, the ranking accorded "comparative costs" by Naval
Industrial and modified Naval Industrial Fund accounting activities is
relatively lower than that indicated by continental U.S., appropriated
fund activities. Further, NIF activities attached more weight to "no
source of supply" than that evidenced by overseas, appropriated fund
activities
"Quality" and "other" influencing factors were generally low
ranked by all activity classifications.
Comparative cost estimates . Formal comparative cost estimates
were developed by 76.7 per cent of the respondents when costs were a
determining factor in make-or-buy decisions.
Additional requirements . Activities indicated that when costs were
a determining factor, make decisions sometimes generated added require-
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The high proportion of NIF and Modified NIF accounting activities
indicating "additional or special purpose tools" is partly attributed to
unique industrial functions performed by the public works departments
of certain ordnance activities
.
Inclusion of overhead . When cost was a determining factor in
make-or-buy decisions, 79.3 per cent of the participants reported the
inclusion of overhead cost prorations in comparative estimates. Only
one out of 150 respondents indicated that fixed elements of overhead
allocations were regarded as "sunk costs" and irrelevant for purposes
of comparative cost estimates.
Supply support . When lead time was a deciding factor for pro-
curable, non-standard stock items with recurring demands, respondents
indicated that the absence of arrangements to stock or buy with imprest





























Who makes the decision . Activities were requested to specify
,
by organizational title , the level at which final make-or-buy determinations
were generally made.. The following results were obtained.
Continental/ Overseas NIF and




Shop supervisor 1 1
Maintenance 34 10 15
"t^ontrol Director









Supply Officer and 3
Public Works Officer
Totals 89 30 31
A number of respondents reported that all work-authorization
authority escalated, organizationally, with estimated cost. Make
decisions would necessarily follow this organizational pattern, and
this policy accounts for the fifth row of the above array.
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Authority delegation . Authority for make-or-buy decisions was
explicitly included in delegation of job order authorization authority in
the case of 52 organizations, or 34.7 per cent of those participating.
Local policies . Formal or informal policies which influenced
make-or-buy decisions were existent in 64 or 42.7 per cent of the
organization. These policies are categorized as follows:
Number of
Policy summation organizations
Buy all standard signs ........... 2
Buy whenever possible 20
Buy whenever less expensive.
or workload is prohibitive 4
Consider availability,
lead time , cost , workload
and capability, and quality 7
Make whenever possible 1
Consider cost and lead time . 7
Do not accept requests for
fabrication 5






"no cost" military labor 1
Make when possible because
of training and lead time 3
Make when possible due to
material fund scarcity 2
Make unless clearly more
economical to buy 1
Make on occasion with short-
term loans of personnel
from industrial department 1
Consider material fund
availability and workload 1
Consider lead time and work load 1
Consider gold flow; make no
standard furniture or
furnishings 1





II . A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
It is also clear that with respect to general problems of
make or buy, arguments against making are usually arguments
for buying, and vice versa.*
Many military logistic and support decisions are essentially
economic decisions in that they are concerned with the efficient utiliza-
3
tion of resources . Public works problems of choice involving alternative
uses of manpower, materials and equipment are essentially resource
allocation problems. The best alternative is the choice which represents
the best allocation
,
In theory then, the correct make-or-buy decision is the alternative
of least economic cost, since least cost in this broad sense represents
the allocation that produces maximum utility. The dilemma is in deter-
mining this "cost". Some of its elements are easily overlooked; others,
when identified, cannot be satisfactorily stated in dollars and require
generalizations
.
The standard, which will be employed in the following discussions,
is the economic goal of achieving the best possible utilization of resources
c ' James W„ Culliton, Make or Buy (Boston: Harvard University,
Graduate School of Business Administration, 1942), p. 5.
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)
Chapter VII , "Efficiency in Military Decisions. "
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Overhead . The majority of public works organizations responding
indicated that, when costs were a determining factor, their comparative
estimates included certain prorations of overhead costs in addition to
direct labor and material. Commonly these costs were allocated as a
percentage of direct labor.
Employee fringe benefits , such as employer insurance contributions,
may be expected to vary directly and proportionately with direct labor.
However, cost accounting, and Naval Industrial Fund accounting in
particular, emphasizes the recovery of "full" cost, i.e. , accounting cost.
Thus customer activity services are "priced" to reflect the absorption of
fixed overhead. Similarly, appropriated funds administered by NIF activities
are assessed a proportionate share of certain overhead expense. While
these charges are valid considerations for customer decision-making, they
are not always relevant in the case of non-customer work. Overhead pro-
rations invariably contain elements of cost which are fixed in the short
run.
The local make or buy decision-maker is primarily concerned with
incremental and escapeable costs. Should he decide to make rather than
to buy, what additional.costs may he expect to incur? If he elects to buy,
what costs will be avoided? In the short run only direct, variable costs
may be expected to change. For the long run, as in the case of a
41

precedent-setting decision, other expenses and investment, costs may
become incremental or escapeable.
Job order estimates are generally prepared in a form which, by
insertion of appropriate accounting data and authorizing signatures, are
translated into production orders. Thus job order estimates are accounting
cost estimates. For control purposes, this accounting compatability is as
it should be. It is essential that the decision-maker recognize that
estimates in this form are not always suitable for an analysis of alternative
choices
.
Material fund scarcity . A number of respondents reported that it was
local policy to consistently make rather than buy due to the lack of avail-
ability of material funds. Such policies are precipitated as a consequence
of local budget and control procedures which set aside the estimated pay-
roll for a given-size work force and thereafter exercise a tight-fisted control
over the "material money" balance. The control of labor cost becomes a
matter of keeping a fixed work force productively employed.
Under such circumstances the make-or-buy alternative is negated
by a dominating fiscal policy. A fallacious tendency to regard all labor
costs as fixed in the long run is encouraged, and the best allocation of
labor and material resources is severely handicapped. If material fund
shortages persist and the overall annual budget figure is substantially
correct, work force adjustments would* be in order.
42

" Free " military labor. Comments from an activity employing
military personnel in direct labor functions indicated that comparative
alternative cost estimates were not developed because of "no cost"
military labor. A dominant make argument under the circumstances is
incorrect. While military labor cost is not an explicit outlay under
locally held allotments , military pay is a very real expenditure to the
Department of the Navy.
Adherence to a consistent policy of make with "no cost"
military labor could result in an excessive personnel allowance in a
long-run situation
.
Training considerations . Several activities indicated local practice
was to make rather than buy in order to facilitate military training . The
public works organizations in these instances were predominately staffed
with military personnel.
The training of military personnel is unquestionably a valid con-
sideration, but that it should consistently be a conclusive reason for
selecting the make alternative is suspect. Considerations range from
the identification of specific assignments with the practical factor skills
of the ratings involved to the broader picture of personnel rotation patterns




If the value of training derived can be quantified , it should be
incorporated in a comparative cost analysis along with the cost of
military labor. More often training is of an intangible nature, and there
is a prevalent temptation to ignore costs not borne by local funds or to
seek to rationalize decisions in qualitative terms. "Military training"
arguments may unwittingly be "free military labor" arguments in disguise.
Idle capacity . Collectively, respondents indicated a relatively low
ranking for workload or capability as a dominant factor influencing make-or-
buy decisions. When other conclusive arguments do not dictate a decision
a careful examination of capacity utilization warrants consideration.
Ideal work center loading is extremely difficult to achieve. Despite
a substantial departmental backlog, intermittent slack will occur which
cannot always be resolved by shifting personnel among work centers.
Work force adjustments are not readily or inexpensively accomplished
in the short run on other than a detail or transfer basis. Reduction in
force procedures with accompanying terminal leave expense and resultant
disruptions are costly. Rehiring involves a sacrifice in efficiency while
new employees adjust.
Consequently in some very short-run situations , labor may be
viewed as momentarily fixed. In such instances an iron-clad policy
of always buy can lead to incorrect decisions. Rather it would be
pertinent to consider the alternative employment value of the labor which
would otherwise be diverted to fabrication.
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There are two sides to every coin. Although making can be
advantageous during certain slack situations
,
buying helps to smooth
out the peaks of heightened activity.
Cost "creep " . Survey responses made no reference to frequency
as a factor influencing make-or-buy decisions. Make decisions, which
appear quite correct when viewed individually or from a short-run per-
spective , can in fact be incorrect when viewed aggregately or from the
standpoint of a longer interval of time.
The frequency with which a particular requirement recurs is usually
relevant in decisions to make or buy. Making an item over a sustained
interval may introduce cost considerations either not envisioned or
necessarily pertinent for sporadic or short-run ."occurence s .
For instance , a need may be eventually generated for additional
tools or improved equipment to facilitate repeated- fabrications . Nominally
fixed elements of overhead expense will creep upward if a substantial
volume is generated over a period of time. It is helpful to recall that
in the economic sense ail costs are variable in the long run.
Supply support . Long-run implications are equally relevant when
considering supply support. The matter of quantity — sufficient quantity
at the right time — must necessarily be viewed in the context of time.
The right demand rate for an item can enable procurement personnel
to attract new vendors , secure lower price quotations , or arrange for
45

improved delivery schedules. If buy-versus-make economies offset or
exceed inventory holding costs , consolidated ordering and stocking
warrants consideration. These and other possibilities can alleviate
excessive lead time and less than minimum order quantity problems.
When other criteria are met, stock fund availability is often
constraining. The opportunity cost concept may prove helpful in these
instances. For example, there may be no comparative advantage in
sacrificing the present paint stock held by supply to stock an inventory
of kitchen sinks. On the other hand, maintenance and operation fund
investments in "bench stocks" of special material create artificial
"material money" shortages.
Close liaison with supply representatives is paramount. They, too,
have a resource allocation problem, and if unaware of relevant con-
siderations, they may sub-optimize.
No source of supply . Under some circumstance, time is of the
essence. In instances, such as a casualty to critical operational
equipment or the breakdown of an obsolete item, make decisions may be
unavoidable
.
It is difficult to envision a material item for which there is actually
"no source of supply" in the strictest sense. A more plausible explanation
is that when time is of the essence no supplier has the item on his shelf
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or no manufacturer has it in production. "No source of supply" in
reality can be another way of saying that the lead time is prohibitive
or it is more convenient to make.
When time is not decisive, the preparation of specifications
suitable for procurement may be economically warranted for high cost
items
, even when infrequently required
.
"No-cost " materials . In one instance it was reported that the
availability of "free" material dictated make decisions. Occasionally
this argument is valid, but generally it should be viewed with skepticism.
Often it is the material analogy of the "free" military labor argument.
Material is truly "free" only when its usage incurs no opportunity
loss. Suppose, for example, that certain salvaged or scrap material on
hand is utilized to make an item, since by omitting material charges the
cost of making appears less than the cost of buying. Subsequently the
purchase of identical material is necessitated for other work. Was it less
costly to make than to buy? Material, which has been expensed and is
'free" in an accounting sense, frequently has an imputed value in the
economic sense. Such opportunity costs are relevant in the decision-
making process
.
To view no-cost surplus materials obtained via excess listings
from other governmental activities as "free", similarly, presupposes that
there is no other potential user with a better application. Inefficient
47

utilization of such material may minimize charges against local allot-
ments but at the net expense of government appropriations. Other
relevant costs frequently overlooked in the case of excess materials
are the handling and shipping expenses incurred by non-local funds.
Capital cost . While local funds absorb plant maintenance
expenses, capital or plant account acquisitions for the most part are
borne by other than annual maintenance and operations allotments.
MCON appropriations finance the construction of new facilities
„
major
equipment is furnished by cognizant bureaus on an allowance basis, and
other minor improvements and equipment acquisitons are obtained via
special allotments. On occasion this feature of Navy financial manage-
ment encourages narrow perspectives and sets the stage for sub-optimal
decisions
.
The expense of facility alterations, special tool purchases, or
equipment inventory additions directly attributable to make decisions are
relevant costs , whether or not they are financed with local maintenance
and operations funds. Such costs would be avoidable by a decision to
buy; accordingly, analyses should consider these costs in addition to
the added maintenance involved.
On the other hand , a decision to buy something now being made
also introduces capital expense considerations, if equipment can be
retired as a consequence. Provided the equipment can be usefully
48

allocated to other purposes, a relevant investment cost is avoided.
While the "sunk" cost of equipment with no alternate use would be
irrelevant, the reduction of bureau controlled equipment allowances
permits the avoidance of future and relevant replacement costs
.
Policy and review . The volume of potential Make-or-buy decisions
confronting a public works organization necessarily leads to attempts to
routinize their processing, and local policies evolve. Approximately 42.7
per cent of the organizations responding indicated local policies existed
which influenced make-or-buy decisions . For the greater part these
were informal or unwritten policies.
Local policies supporting directives of higher authority, as in the
instance of overseas purchases, essentially do not influence make-or-buy
decisions . Rather the decision in such cases is to comply with the direc-
tive or face the consequences . Other policies , such as those which
prohibit the fabrication of furniture, tend to express the obvious. This
type would likely not exist were it not for the propensity of local target
holders to "conserve" their material monies, at the expense of public
works maintenance funds and station allotments , by generating work
requests in lieu of appropriate requisitions.
Between these extremes is a range for the formulation and emergence
of significant make-or-buy policies—- significant because in their absence
determinations would be deliberative rather than automatic.
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New products are continuously introduced on the market, local
circumstances change, and the passage of time introduces new con-
tingencies. Last year's decision may not be correct under the conditions
prevailing today, and make-or-buy policies should be periodically
reviewed. Further, the line between policy and custom is frequently
obscure. Of equal importance is the assurance that invalid premises do
not serve as precedents.
Who decides . The inherent peril in any decision is the possibility
of overlooking relevant considerations , but to restrict make-or-buy decision-
making to those organizational levels which are cognizant of all side effects
and where all costs are controllable is manifestly impracticable, if not
impossible Cost implications and other consequences consistently cut
across departmental, and even command, organizational lines.
Further, the number of potential make-or-buy decisions which must
be handled in the normal course of public works operations requires their
systematic disposition. It is expedient that make-or-buy decision-making
be integrated with work input processing procedures. For these practical
reasons, authority delegations should generally parallel work-authorization
authority delegation.
It is considered advisable, however, that this authority be explicitly
stated rather than left to inference. Only 34.7 per cent of the respondents
explicitly did so. Work-authorization authority is conventionally delegated
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in ranges of estimated cost— estimated accounting cost if job order
estimating techniques are used. The unique issues at stake in make-or-
buy decisions may recommend exceptional handling for apparently insig-
nificant outlays . A decision to buy an item now being made or to initiate
making an item presently purchased, for example, could require higher
management review because of the volume and long-run implications.
Since job order estimates are attuned to accounting purposes,
precedent-setting and other significant make-or-buy decisions will







In a very real sense, the correct answer to the question:
"Which is preferable, make or buy?" is "It depends upon the
circumstances . " *
I. SUMMARY
As stated in the beginning, the purpose of this paper was to
determine what factors influenced public works decisions to make or
buy material components used by maintenance forces and, coincidentally
,
to evaluate the practices followed in arriving at these decisions. The
make-or-buy literature searched was generally deficient for purposes of
this study in two respects.
First was the matter of applicability to Navy public works organiza-
tions . The literature was oriented to the business world and in particular
to industrial manufacturing. The former presented no especial problem in
that improved input factor utilization and cost reduction possess appeal
for government administrator and profit maximizer alike. Contrasts in
production and service functions are more difficult to reconcile. The
James W. Culliton, Make or Buy (Boston: Harvard University,
Graduate School of Business Administration, 1942), p. 98.

industrial concern exists to manufacture—its fundamental make-or-buy
problem is to determine the best "mix" of things to make so that the
remainder required in the final product may be bought. Manufacturing
is an ancillary consideration for a public works organization. "In house"
capacity to fabricate is primarily the by-product of a capability required
to maintain-—the basic make-or-buy problem is to determine if it is
necessary to make at alL. On balance / however, many considerations
are identical in either context, and useful parallels may be drawn from
others
.
The second criticism that could be offered with respect to the
literature is the matter of clarity. Writings were generally imprecise
about the exact type of make-or-buy situation under discussion. Levine
commented on this point and sought to remedy what he considered the
2
resultant confusion. In short, the question of applicability is also at
the core of this deficiency, but in a more specific sense. Considerable
care was required to identify appropriate arguments with particular
circumstances
.




The data obtained and presented in Section I, Chapter IV were
considered to depict the factors influencing material component make-
or-buy decisions in the public works organizations of the Naval Material
Support Establishment. Since the entire population was sampled with
81.5 per cent participation, this conclusion was not predicated on a
statistical test of significance.
Information obtained from the survey was further considered to
support the conservative assumption, stated in ; Chapter I, that decisions
sometimes include irrelevant or exclude relevant considerations. This
conclusion, however, was based on a few isolated policies and practices
noted among those reported. Other deductions, without resorting to
generalization, were inhibited in that specific decisions could not be
related to specific situations.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The large percentage of respondents reporting the inclusion of
overhead prorations in comparative cost estimates and the questionable
local practices cited in the analysis imply that make-or-buy decisions
may be improved. Toward this end, it is suggested that guidelines be
developed and disseminated among public works organizations. Ostensibly
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such guidance could be incorporated with maintenance control program
criteria. Inasmuch as the retention of local option is a requisite, guidance
should be informative rather than directive in nature.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Surveys are indispensible for studies of this subject, however,
dependency upon questionnaires imposes decided limitations . Relevancy
is the acid test in make-or-buy problems, and decisions cannot be properly
evaluated unless all the constraints which influenced them are identifiable.
Herein is the primary shortcoming of questionnaire use as experienced in
this investigation of the subject. For this reason and the inexactitude
noted in previous writings, it would be considered best that future research
deal with specific cases. In this connection supplemental techniques,
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MAKE OR BUY DECISIONS IN PUBLIC WORKS ORGANIZATIONS
(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)
Information . This questionnaire is concerned with decisions to either
fabricate or purchase material components utilized on job orders
accomplished by Public Works Shops. A typical illustration is the
decision to purchase or fabricate traffic control signs for installation
by maintenance personnel. Determinations to accomplish repair,
renovation, alteration or minor improvement projects by BUDOCKS
contract versus station forces are not included in this survey.
1 . (Activity)
2. Approximate FY 1964 expenditures for Public Works functions.
(thousands). Average number of Maintenance




3. Type of official accounting employed. (Check one)
OTHER (Specify)NIF APPROPRIATION
4. Is costing on a "standard cost" basis?
Relative to "make or buy" decisions :
5. Are the majority of decisions dictated by
policies or directives which prohibit shop




6. Rank in order of dominance (1 through 6)
factors which most frequently influence
decisions to "make":
NO SOURCE OF SUPPLY





When costs are a determining factor :
7. Are formal comparative cost estimates developed? YES NO
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SPECIAL PURPOSE TOOLS ?
REARRANGEMENT?
NONE
10. In addition to purchase or stock price,
do estimates to "buy" include




Storage costs (if stocked) ?
Other (Specify)
9. In addition to direct civilian labor and material,
do comparative estimates to "make" include



























When procurement lead time is a determining factor :
11. For recurring requirements of procurable non-
standard stock items , does the Supply
Department
Stock? J YES NO
Buy with imprest funds? ~2 YES NO
Arrange for blanket purchase
order ? YES NO
12. Decisions to '\make" are generated by the
absence of such' arrangements (Check one):
NEVER RARELY OCCASIONALLY FREQUENTLY
Incidental .to the preparation of "make or buy" comparative
cost estimates:
13c Are EPS utilized as the basis for "make"
estimates? YES NO
14. Is historical cost information readily
available from the official accounting
system for comparative cost estimates? YES NO
15. If answer to question 14 is yes, is the
information suitable for purposes of
preparing comparative cost estimates? YES NO
16. Comparative cost estimates are generally
preapred by (specify organizational component
or title)
Authorization to make "make or buy" decisions :
17. Estimate analysis and final determination is
generally made by (specify organizational title)
18. Is authority for make or buy decisions explicitly






19. Is a locally formulated policy existent
which influences make or buy decisions? YES NO
20. If answer to question 19 is yes, please
attach a copy or briefly summarize
informal policy in the space below:
21. Please furnish any comments or additional information
which you desire or consider pertinent in the space
below:
(DATE) (SIGNATURE AND TITLE)
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